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ABSTRACT 
Title: The Buyout of ProSiebenSat.1 by KKR and Permira – Blockbuster or Box Office Bomb? 
This case study describes the buyout of ProSiebenSat.1 during the peak of the buyout boom in 
2007. Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, it illustrates how the financial sponsors 
pursued an internationalization strategy by combining ProSiebenSat.1 with another portfolio com-
pany which eventually led to the financial distress of ProSiebenSat.1. The case study addresses the 
unique features of the investment thesis, namely the target characteristics as well as transaction 
structure and how the investors adjusted their initial investment thesis to encounter the issues faced. 
The deal is an example of many unsuccessful buyouts which happened during the financial crisis.  











When Thomas Krenz heard the news he was electrified. The Managing Partner at Permira, the UK 
based private equity firm, had just learned that Axel Springer’s takeover bid for ProSiebenSat.1 
(P7S1), the German TV broadcasting and media company, had been vetoed by the German antitrust 
commission. After a series of broken deals – Permira recently lost the bidding processes for the 
Linde forklift truck business as well as for building supply business Max Bahr – he was under 
pressure to close a deal. As if that was not enough, the investment in telecommunication provider 
Debitel performed poorly and Permira had just lost its share in automotive supplier Kiekert to 
creditors due to financial leverage issues. P7S1 was the opportunity Krenz needed right now. 
THE BUYOUT BOOM 
The private equity industry was booming in 2006.1 Large government surpluses and pension wealth 
increased capital allocations to alternative asset classes such as private equity and the new syndi-
cated bank debt model (“originate-and-sell”) improved liquidity in debt markets.2 Higher liquidity 
and low interest rates in return led to lower credit spreads which contributed to high leverage ratios 
and often light covenants in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Financial sponsors increasingly turned 
their attention towards Europe where the total buyout value had increased more than five times to 
more than €124bn since 1996. Although the UK still represented the largest European buyout mar-
ket, other countries such as France, Germany or the Netherlands had become major targets. With 
record funds being raised – Permira closed its oversubscribed fourth fund at €11bn in July 2006, 
which was the largest fund ever raised by a European sponsor and the fourth-largest worldwide – 
                                                 
1  See Exhibit 1 for an overview of the global private equity deal volume and European LBO statistics over time.   
2  Syndicated bank debt is originated by one or several banks and placed with a group of investors. It can be in the 
form of structured products such as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) where several loans are pooled and sold 
to investors in different tranches, depending on their risk appetite. Syndicated bank debt can also be traded in the 
secondary market, thus increasing liquidity even further.  
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European private equity firms pushed into spheres historically occupied by US “mega funds”. 
Backed by huge amounts of “dry powder”, private equity investors were under pressure to deliver 
returns and the competition for assets was fierce. 
THE EUROPEAN TV & ENTERTAINMENT LANDSCAPE 
The big picture 
In European countries, public TV broadcasters usually coexist with commercial TV broadcasters. 
Public TV broadcasters perform a public service, usually avoiding advertising, sponsored by the 
government or through license fees of households. Commercial TV broadcasters on the other hand 
may be free-to-air TV broadcasters, who finance through advertising sales, or Pay-TV providers, 
who charge the consumer for their services. As free-to-air broadcasters profit from advertising 
sales, they indirectly depend on a variety of factors, such as GDP growth and cyclicality, de-
mographics and the buying power of households. Generally, the European media and TV broad-
casting industry is characterized by high market concentration. While Western European countries 
still grew moderately, economic growth in Central and Eastern European countries fueled media 
and entertainment spending and was expected to continue over the following years.3  
In 2006, the media industry was on the verge of significant changes. Rising high-speed broadband 
and wireless internet penetration rates changed media consumption behavior and shifted content 
distribution to digital and mobile platforms. As a consequence, Internet Protocol TV (IPTV) was 
becoming increasingly popular and TV subscription growth had constantly surpassed traditional 
TV advertising over the last years.4 IPTV enabled to offer streaming-based services, such as live 
and time-shifted TV as well as video-on-demand. The market entrance of telecommunication com- 
                                                 
3  See Exhibit 2 for an overview of market growth and market size in Europe. 
4  TV subscriptions and license fees describe revenues generated from Pay-TV services and fees paid to public broad-
casters. TV advertising describes revenues generated from advertising sales on free-to-air channels.  
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panies further intensified competition from the subscription TV segment. Thus, traditional TV 
broadcasters faced an uncertain future. Although it was expected that new analog channels, high 
definition TV (HDTV) and digital broadcasting would attract advertisers to free-to-air channels in 
the near future, multichannel advertising through digital platforms and mobile devices was ex-
pected to become a major advertising growth driver. 
The TV industry in Germany 
Since the German TV market was de-nationalized in 1981, Germany has become one of the largest 
media and TV markets in Europe with one clear distinction: Germany has the largest Free-TV 
offering in Europe while Pay-TV is a lot more popular in other major markets, such as the UK. The 
German TV market is highly concentrated as public broadcasters ARD and ZDF and private broad-
casters RTL and P7S1 are the only channels with nationwide reach.5 Although US companies, such 
as Time Warner (n-tv, CNN Germany) or Viacom (MTV Germany), have made efforts to grab 
market shares, their viewers’ ratings and advertising shares are negligible. Alike the TV industry, 
the German advertising industry is dominated by a small number of big players. TV broadcasters 
source advertising deals from advertising agencies, which bundle marketing content and place it 
on behalf of their contract partners. A major influence on the negotiation position is therefore the 
“cost per mille”, which describes the cost per thousand impressions within a target group. The dual 
broadcasting system leads to adverse competition policies: Whereas public broadcasters’ main mis-
sion is to provide information safeguarded by the government, private broadcasters compete in the 
market to maximize profits. However, competition is limited by federal institutions (Federal State 
Media Authorities, KEK, KDLM), which propose regulations to control informational content and 
diversity and limit media concentration and advertising time.  
                                                 
5  See Exhibits 3 and 4 for a more detailed overview of the German media and TV industry. 
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PROSIEBENSAT.1 AND HAIM SABAN (2003-2006) 
Business overview  
Based in Munich, the ProSiebenSat.1 Group (P7S1) is a leading commercial TV broadcaster and 
media company in the German-speaking region. While advertising-financed Free TV still repre-
sented the group’s core business in 2006, P7S1 had recently started diversifying its revenue streams 
into new areas.6 These included quiz channel 9Live, which generated revenues from telephone 
calls, video-on-demand offerings through Germany’s leading platform Maxdome, different Pay-
TV channels and internet platforms, such as social network lokalisten.de or video platform 
MyVideo. Furthermore, P7S1 operated its own production and distribution division. 
Insolvency of Kirch Media Group and Haim Saban era 
P7S1 was part of Kirch Group, one of the largest German media groups, belonging to Leo Kirch, 
a German media entrepreneur. Kirch’s media empire not only consisted of P7S1 but also included 
Pay-TV channel Premiere as well as media production, distribution and licensing businesses among 
other assets. Suffering from a heavy debt burden, Deutsche Bank manager Rolf-Ernst Breuer ulti-
mately triggered the insolvency process of Kirch Group in 2002 by publicly questioning the cre-
ditworthiness of the group. What followed was a lengthy negotiation process about the breakdown 
of the group’s assets. Although P7S1 attracted many international investors (e.g. French broad-
caster TF1 and US film studio Columbia) as well as old shareholders of Kirch Media Group (e.g. 
Silvio Berlusconi’s Italian media firm Mediaset and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp.), it was the 
Hamburg based publishing firm Bauer, who first negotiated a contract in December. It was how-
ever never signed because Haim Saban submitted a higher offer in the very last minute. 
                                                 
6  See Exhibit 5 for a segment overview of P7S1.  
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The Israeli and American media entrepreneur, who made a fortune with the production of Power 
Rangers, is one of the most renowned media investors in the world. Together with other financial 
sponsors, Saban acquired 72% of P7S1 voting common shares for €525m, corresponding to €7.50 
per share, through their investment vehicle German Media Partners in a club deal in August 2003.7 
In the meantime, Permira acquired a majority stake in Premiere from Kirch Group’s creditors.  
Saban faced a great challenge. Suffering from a weak economy, the German TV advertising market 
had shrunk for the third year in a row. Saban based his strategy on cost optimization, strengthening 
of the core business and expansion into new non-advertising revenue streams. He followed his 
strategy and results should show quickly. At the end of 2003, P7S1 had more than tripled its earn-
ings. In early 2004, the group started a refinancing process to reduce the group’s debt level and 
improve ratings. As part of the insolvency plan, Kirch Media sold its remaining 15% stake to Ger-
man Media Partners and Axel Springer in September, leaving Saban with 88% of common and 
13% of preferred stock. At the end of 2004, all four Free-TV channels were profitable again. In 
2005, P7S1 partnered with major telecommunication firms, such as Vodafone and Telekom, to 
offer selected channels on mobile phones and computers. Furthermore, the group acquired full 
ownership in quiz channel 9Live and travel sales channel sonnenklar TV. After another period of 
record audience shares and strong financial performance, Axel Springer offered to acquire all 
shares from German Media Partners in August 2005, thus ringing in the end of the Saban era. In 
September, Axel Springer submitted a public tender offer for the remaining preferred shares. Since 
then, the deal was subject to approval by antitrust and media regulators.  
                                                 
7  The consortium consisted of Saban’s investment firm Saban Capital Group, Thomas H. Lee Partners, Bain Capital, 
Hellman & Friedman, Providence Equity Partners, Quadrangle Capital Partners, Putnam Investments and AEP 
Capital. Axel Springer, a major German media and publishing company, has been a shareholder at P7S1 before. 
For further information on P7S1’s shareholder structure, see Exhibit 6.  
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THE BUYOUT BY KKR AND PERMIRA (2007-2014) 
Winning the deal 
After it became clear that a takeover by Axel Springer will not be approved by authorities, Saban 
had engaged investment banks J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley to run an auction process for his 
stake with first round offers due in November 2006. Permira Managing Partner Thomas Krenz 
knew he had to be quick this time. P7S1 had already attracted interest from major private equity 
firms, such as Apax Partners, Texas Pacific Group and CVC Capital Partners, as well as from 
Italian Mediaset and other strategic investors. Despite the failed takeover, Axel Springer also did 
not admit defeat and acquired a 25% stake in Turkish Doğan Media Group, who participated in the 
auction. Although Krenz had a track record in the German TV industry since the successful IPO of 
Premiere in 2005, he knew winning the deal would not be easy. In the final bidding round in De-
cember, it was him against a consortium bid of Apax Partners and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners 
as well as Doğan Media Group and all had one thing in common: they already owned TV assets.8  
Together with KKR, Permira had acquired a majority stake in Scandinavian Broadcasting Systems 
(SBS), a leading European commercial TV and radio broadcasting firm with operations in Central 
and Western Europe, in October 2005 in a transaction valuing SBS at €2.1bn. With this ace up his 
sleeve, Krenz had again teamed up with KKR and was confident that they could convince P7S1’s 
management. The idea was simple yet promising: Combine SBS and P7S1 to create a new Pan-
European broadcaster that is able to compete with RTL.  
On December 14th, KKR and Permira signed a share purchase agreement (SPA) to buy the 51% 
stake of German Media Partners for €28.71 per common share and €22.40 per preferred share, with 
                                                 
8  Apax Partners acquired a stake in Central European Media Enterprises (CME), an Eastern European free-to-air 
broadcaster in August 2006. Doğan Media Group operates TV channels in Turkey. 
9 
closing date in March 2007. In April 2007, their investment vehicle Lavena Holding 4 acquired 
additional 0.3% of preferred shares for €22.45 through a public tender offer.9 Krenz’s run of bad 
luck had finally ended.  
SBS Broadcasting and ProSiebenSat.1 – the perfect wedding? 
A merger with SBS would immediately transform P7S1 into the second-largest TV broadcaster in 
Europe, with 26 Free-TV stations, 24 Pay-TV channels and 22 radio networks in 13 countries in 
Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, German-speaking countries and Eastern Europe, reaching 
more than 78m households.10 Further, it was estimated that through joint content rights acquisition 
and format sharing, the group could realize significant synergies of up to €90m annually, thereof 
€30m in additional revenues and €60m in cost reductions, by 2010. Together, P7S1 and SBS could 
drive industry consolidation in Europe, share resources to strengthen their core businesses and ex-
pand into new media segments. The two groups were considered to be “a perfect fit”.  
In June, P7S1 acquired 100% of SBS in a transaction valuing the firm at €3.3bn.11 The deal was 
entirely financed by new loans syndicated by a group of banks, led by Bank of America, Credit 
Suisse, J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers among others. Dutch Telegraaf Media 
Group (TMG), who held 20% in SBS before, received a call option to acquire 12% of P7S1 com-
mon shares from Lavena Holdings, exercisable in June 2008. If TMG would not exercise, KKR 
and Permira had a put option on TMG maturing in August 2008. As part of the acquisition, P7S1 
bought back a €150m bond issue prematurely and replaced existing financial liabilities through the 
new syndicated loans. 
                                                 
9  See Exhibit 6 for information about the shareholder structure, Exhibit 7 for a sources and uses table and Exhibit 
8 for further information on the holding structure. 
10  See Exhibit 9 for geographic reach. 
11  See Exhibits 10 for a sources and uses table and Exhibit 11 for key financials of SBS. 
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ProSiebenSat.1 – a new era 
CEO Guillaume de Posch had just seen P7S1 turning from being part of an insolvency process into 
a major European player. However, after the biggest acquisition in company history, he knew P7S1 
would not be able to make any major acquisition that required new capital in the near future. His 
job now was to focus on integrating SBS and realizing promised synergies. On top of that, P7S1 
had been found guilty for so-called “share deals” earlier this year and would have to pay a €120m 
fine in 2008, imposed by the German Federal Cartel Office.12 After assessing all formats on prof-
itability and reach, P7S1 announced the termination of Sat.1 News and dismissal of 180 employees 
at the Berlin and Munich offices as well as the closing of the SBS Amsterdam office, which would 
cut another 20 jobs. Nevertheless, the group completed a few minor acquisitions in 2007, one of 
them being the acquisition of Austrian Free TV station PULS TV.13 
In January 2008, Axel Springer sold its full stake, 12% of common and 12% of preference shares, 
to Lavena Holdings for €509m. According to Axel Springer the stake had become a pure financial 
investment and advertising market prospects did not look promising.  
ProSiebenSat.1 and the financial crisis 
For the institutional investors and hedge funds who had invested in the leveraged loans of P7S1, 
the news of Lehman Brothers’ insolvency in September 2008 was just another piece in a series of 
bad events. Had they known that the value of the securities would drop by 27% - as they did in 
February 2008 - they would not have invested in these collateralized loan obligations. However, 
first signs that investors panicked and liquidity started drying up already showed in 2007. Shortly 
                                                 
12  In share deals, TV broadcasters give discounts to advertising agencies for giving them more advertising time.  
13  Other transactions in 2007 included the acquisition of a majority stakes in German online price comparison portal 
billiger.de and German online advice platform wer-weiss-was.de as well as the purchase of the remaining shares 
in German video platform MyVideo.   
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before the SBS takeover, the average price on loans in the US secondary market dropped below 
par value and European markets were heading the same way. Although the P7S1 loan had been 
oversubscribed and its margin been cut during the marketing phase, the value had dropped once it 
was released onto the market.   
The year 2008 had not been easy for P7S1. The new advertising time sales model for the German 
market, which had been developed after the legal issues in 2007, had not paid off and impacted 
first-quarter results heavily. The effect was amplified when the financial crisis spread to the real 
economy, leading to a slowdown in advertising spending. As a reaction, P7S1 introduced signifi-
cant changes within the management team. In January, the Supervisory Board came to an agree-
ment with Lothar Lanz (CFO for 11 years) to leave P7S1 in June. Due to weak advertising sales, 
Peter Christmann (Executive Board Member for Sales and Marketing) also resigned in June. Ulti-
mately, Guillame de Posch (CEO) left the group in the end of 2008 “to seek new challenges”. With 
investors panicking, financial markets reacted accordingly. After P7S1 announced two profit warn-
ings within one year, the stock hit an all-time low of €1.26 in December.14 
For Permira, the year had been equally difficult. Despite various attempts to improve cost structures 
at P7S1, earnings were negative and the capital structure was trembling. P7S1 decided to relocate 
Sat.1 from Berlin to Munich, centralize all administrative functions and merge SevenOne Media 
and SevenOne Interactive. Further, the management planned to cut 225 jobs across the German 
divisions. In addition, P7S1 signed an outsourcing agreement, transferring all IT assets from the 
group’s technology service provider ProSiebenSat.1 Produktion to IBM. The group also sold Pay-
TV channel C More for €303m, which it had acquired as part of SBS’ Scandinavian assets only a 
                                                 
14  See Exhibit 12 for P7S1 stock price information.  
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year before. Yet, Permira had a hard time explaining to their limited partners (LPs) why the invest-
ment was currently valued at about 20% of the initial investment. At least the exercise of the put 
option against TMG had returned €28.71 per share. On top of that, they had received a lot of media 
attention – something private equity investors traditionally avoided – for the decision to distribute 
a dividend of €270m. 
When the new CEO Thomas Ebeling began his job in March 2009, P7S1 had become a penny 
stock. Competition in domestic markets was fierce as advertising-financed broadcasters suffered 
from the financial crisis while public broadcasters targeted their audience shares. Ebeling’s first 
measures aimed to cut costs, reduce debt and stabilize the stock price. P7S1 sold online platform 
billiger.de as well as production unit ProSiebenSat.1 Berlin Produktion and began exploring stra-
tegic options for N24. In addition to 1.1m preference shares which P7S1 had bought back in 2008, 
the group repurchased another 4.9m preference shares from April to June. Furthermore, common 
shareholders forwent any dividends while preferred shareholders received a minimum dividend of 
€0.02 per share. The strategic shakeup also claimed further personnel victims: Patrick Tillieux 
(COO) left P7S1 in June, Klaus Peter Schulz (Executive board member Sales and Marketing) left 
P7S1 after only ten months in July and Marcus Englert (Executive board member New Media) left 
the group in November although his contract ran until 2010.   
In the meantime, KKR and Permira hired investment bank Houlihan Lokey to restructure the debt 
in their joint holding company after they had to pay interest from equity.15 Pressure came also from 
hedge funds who had acquired debt instruments of Lavena at a discount earlier. Since the securities 
temporarily traded at 20% of face value, they enjoyed wide support from other creditors.  
                                                 
15  See Exhibit 13 for balance sheet information of Lavena 1 S.à.r.l.. 
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Both, Ebeling and his majority shareholders, were therefore happy when P7S1 ultimately reported 
a consolidated net income of €145m for 2009. After efficient cost reductions and a successful last 
quarter, the group had regained market share and ended the year with a stock price of €5.50. 
Like a phoenix from the ashes? 
In 2010, the advertising market started to recover and TV broadcasters reported strong sales again. 
Simultaneously, J.P. Morgan had been engaged to explore strategic options for the divisions in 
Scandinavia and the Benelux countries. Having reviewed different options for the unprofitable 
news segment, P7S1 agreed on a management buyout of N24 and its production unit in June. De-
spite the favorable development in 2010, P7S1 kept exploring further ways to improve the capital 
structure as liabilities of more than €3.5bn still put weight on the balance sheet. 
In January 2011, KKR and Permira used the stock momentum to sell 8m of their preference shares 
for €24.20 in order to reduce debt and improve liquidity on the Lavena Holding level while J.P. 
Morgan held first discussions about the disposal of the Scandinavian and Benelux business units 
with potential buyers. In April, P7S1 sold the TV and print operations in the Netherlands and the 
TV operations in Belgium to a group of media companies in a transaction valued at €1.2bn.  
P7S1 used the sale to repay €1.2bn of the existing term loans and renegotiate maturities for the 
remaining loans. In addition, the group repurchased another 2.5m preference shares from August 
to September and expanded its online gaming business as well as global sales and content produc-
tion business through further acquisitions. Furthermore, P7S1 signed long-term contracts with all 
major cable network operators in Germany to transmit Free-TV, Pay-TV, HD and video–on–de-
mand content and receive a share in the access fees charged by cable providers. Finally, P7S1 
launched new Free-TV channels in Norway and Hungary and shut down operations at quiz channel 
9Live after an ongoing decline in revenues.  
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Fueled by another record-year, P7S1 landed a coup in January 2012, when it outbid RTL in a 
bidding process for an output deal with Warner Bros. Studios (Harry Potter, The Lord of the Rings, 
The Dark Knight etc.). The group now had contracts with most major Hollywood production firms, 
such as 20th Century Fox, Disney and Paramount Pictures.  
In October 2012, P7S1 was ultimately approaching the sale of its TV and radio broadcasting assets 
in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark after reducing the number of potential buyers to a 
shortlist, consisting of Discovery Communications, Providence Equity Partners and Nordic Capital 
with binding offers due in December. Although Discovery Communications and Modern Times 
Group had already been interested in the Scandinavian broadcasting units back in April 2011, P7S1 
had decided against a disposal when it sold the Belgium and Dutch assets. According to Ebeling, 
the assets then belonged to the core business. It was Discovery Communications, who emerged as 
the winner from the bidding process, agreeing on an enterprise value of €1.3bn.  
The deal finally sealed Ebeling’s strategic shakeup to refocus on German TV Broadcasting, content 
production and global distribution and expansion into digital media. The spread of HDTV-compat-
ible TVs created new growth potential in the German Free-TV business. At the same time, the 
group was experiencing double-digit growth in digital segments, for example in online games and 
video-on-demand offerings, such as Maxdome and MyVideo, which had been developed into an 
online TV station. To further elaborate on these achievements, P7S1 had started a venture business 
which invested in start-ups in selected areas (travel, sports, beauty, health, fashion, home & living 
and market places) in “media-for-equity deals”.16 At the end of 2012, P7S1 sold the TV and radio 
broadcasting operations in Central and Eastern Europe.   
                                                 
16  P7S1 gives advertising time in return for a share of revenues or equity.  
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P7S1 intended to use €500m of the proceeds from the Scandinavian asset disposal for partial re-
payment of term debt and reinvest the remaining amount in operations. Further, P7S1 would pay a 
special dividend of €1.2bn.  
The exit of KKR and Permira 
In the beginning of 2013, KKR and Permira engaged J.P. Morgan to explore exit options for their 
controlling stake. Although strategic buyers, such as Time Warner Inc., Comcast or News Corp., 
were reported to show interest, KKR and Permira decided on a block trade in February, in which 
they placed their entire 18% preference shares for €24.60 per share. Together with the 2012 divi-
dend, they intended to use the proceeds to pay down debt in Lavena Holdings. Until 2013, Permira 
had not distributed any cash from dividends or share disposals to their LPs but used all proceeds to 
pay debt and interest in the Lavena Holdings. In July 2013, the general meeting decided to convert 
all publicly listed preference shares into voting common shares, reducing the stake of KKR and 
Permira from 88% to 44%. In September, KKR and Permira sold another 11% (after conversion) 
in an accelerated book building process for €30.67 per share. In November, the financial sponsors 
placed another 16% (35m shares) on the market at an average price of €31.82. After the P7S1 stock 
price had doubled in 2013, KKR and Permira finally sold their last 17% stake (36m shares) for 
€34.75 per share in an accelerated book building process in January 2014. 
REVIEWING THE DEAL 
Permira had just sold its last stake in P7S1 and Thomas Krenz was lost in thoughts. Certainly the 
investment had not left out anything: a heavy cartel fine at the beginning, the financial crisis and a 
global recession, changes in top-level management, a full-blown strategic repositioning and a lot 
of negative publicity. Somehow it all worked out in the end but he could not stop wondering: 
Should he have made different decisions at some point? 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibit 1: Global Private Equity Deal Volume and European deal statistics (1995 – 2014) 
 
Source: Bain & Company Global Private Equity Reports 2014, 2016 
Exhibit 2: Selected European media and entertainment markets (2006) 
 
Benelux = Belgium, the Netherlands; CEE = The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania; DACH = Aus-
tria, Germany, Switzerland; Scandinavia = Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway 
FX rate ($ to €) = 0.73082 
Source: PwC Global Media and Entertainment Outlook 2008 - 2012 
Exhibit 3: Market shares in Germany (2006) 
 
Viewers older than three years, Monday to Sunday, 3:00 to 3:00, representing 34.99 million households or 73.42 
million people in Germany. 
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Exhibit 4: German TV broadcasting industry revenues (2001 – 2014) 
 
Source: State Media Authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany, National Reports Germany 2006 - 2014  
Exhibit 5: P7S1 segment overview (2007) 
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* P7S1 operates different versions of the
channels, e.g. ProSieben Austria in Austria
or ProSieben Schweiz in Switzerland, with
different advertising and individual news.
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Exhibit 6: P7S1 shareholder structure development (2003 – 2014) 
  
(1) P7S1 treasury shares originate from share buybacks and serve a long-term incentive stock compensation plan. 
(2) The share capital of ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG was initially distributed equally between no-par registered voting 
common shares and no-par publicly listed non-voting preferred shares. 
(3) Preferred shares are given preferential treatment in profit distribution, receiving a priority payment of €0.02 per 
share more from the annual distributable net profit than common shares, and no less than €0.02 per share in any case. 
Source: P7S1 Annual Reports 2003 - 2014 
Exhibit 7: P7S1 sources & uses table (2007) 
 
(1) Senior and junior debt facilities are taken on by Lavena Holding 4 and fully consolidated in Lavena 1 S.à.r.l..  
Source: Lavena 1 S.à.r.l. Annual Report 2007 
Shareholder structure Unit 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kirch Media Group [%] 17%
German Media Partners [%] 0% 13% 13% 13%
Axel Springer [%] 11% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Lavena Holdings [%] 13% 25% 25% 25% 18% 18% 0% 0%
Telegraaf Media Groep [%] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Free float [%] 72% 75% 75% 75% 75% 74% 69% 70% 75% 76% 0% 0%
P7S1 treasury shares (1) [%] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 6% 5% 7% 6% 0% 0%
# of preferred shares [m units] 97.2   109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 -     -     
Kirch Media Group [%] 17%
German Media Partners [%] 72% 88% 88% 88%
Axel Springer [%] 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Lavena Holdings [%] 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 17% 0%
Telegraaf Media Groep [%] 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 0% 0%
Free float [%] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 81% 98%
P7S1 treasury shares (1) [%] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2%
# of common shares [m units] 97.2   109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 109.4 218.8 218.8 
Kirch Media Group [%] 17%
German Media Partners [%] 36% 51% 51% 51%
Axel Springer [%] 11% 12% 12% 12% 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Lavena Holdings [%] 51% 57% 57% 57% 53% 53% 17% 0%
Telegraaf Media Groep [%] 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 0% 0%
Free float [%] 36% 38% 38% 38% 37% 37% 35% 35% 38% 38% 81% 98%
P7S1 treasury shares (1) [%] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2%
Total share capital (2) [€m] 194.5 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 218.8 
Market cap at end of year [€m] 2,499 2,954 3,577 5,437 3,586 525    1,764 4,923 3,089 4,660 6,024 7,271 
Close [€] 12.85 13.50 16.35 24.85 16.39 2.40 8.06 22.50 14.12 21.30 36.00 34.83
High [€] 14.30 17.10 16.35 24.85 30.10 16.62 8.98 23.88 24.80 23.83 36.00 35.55
Low [€] 4.03 12.19 12.80 16.02 16.00 1.26 0.90 8.13 11.49 14.19 21.85 28.35
Dividend per share of preferred stock (3) [€] 0.02 0.30 0.84 0.89 1.25 0.02 0.02 1.14 1.17 5.65 n/a n/a
Dividend per share of common stock [€] 0.00 0.28 0.82 0.87 1.23 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.15 5.63 1.47 1.60
Total dividend for the year [€m] 2 63 182 193 270 2 2 241 246 1201 313 342
Sources of funds €m % Uses of funds €m
Senior debt (1) Shares
Term loan B (Bullet) 686        21% Common shares German Media Partners 2,764     
Term loan C (Bullet) 686        21% Preferred shares German Media Partners 319        
Term loan D (Amortizing) 423        13% Public tender offer 7            
Junior debt (1)
Subordinated loan (PIK) 501        15% Assumed transaction costs (7%) 194        
Total debt 2,296     70%
Equity 987        30%
Total sources 3,284     100% Total uses 3,284     
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Exhibit 8: KKR and Permira holding structure (2007) 
 
(1) In December 2007, Axel Springer AG announced to sell its stake of 12% common stock and 12% preferred stock 
in ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG, which it indirectly held through Sat.1 Beteiligungs GmbH, to Lavena Holding 5 GmbH. 
Axel Springer AG further sold 48% of the share capital of Sat.1 Beteiligungs GmbH to Lavena Holding 5 GmbH.  
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Lavena 1 serves as the 
ultimate holding company 
for P7S1. P7S1 is fully 
consolidated in Lavena 1. 
Furthermore, Lavena 1 
includes the debt facilities 
used by KKR and Permira
to acquire P7S1. The 
holding company was 
registered in Luxembourg 
and liquidated in 2013.
48%
20 
Exhibit 9: P7S1 and SBS geographic footprint (2007) 
 
Source: P7S1 Annual Report 2007 
Exhibit 10: SBS sources & uses table (2007) 
 
(1) Pro Forma EBITDA of P7S1 and SBS for 2006 = €484m (P7S1) + €207m (SBS) = €691m. 
(2) The 12-month average Euribor rate in 2006 was 2.80%.  
Source: P7S1 Annual Report 2007, Lavena 1 S.à.r.l. Annual Report 2007 
Exhibit 11: SBS key financials (2003 – 2006) 
 
Source: SBS Company Information, Press 
SBS Broadcasting

































Sources of funds Interest Maturity €m EBITDA (1) % Uses of funds €m
Senior secured term loan B Euribor + 1.75% (2) Jul-14 1,800     2.6x 43% SBS enterprise value 3,300
Senior secured term loan C Euribor + 1.875% (2) Jul-15 1,800     2.6x 43% P7S1 net debt to be refinanced 122
Other expenses and remaining funds 178
Total acquisition loan agreement 3,600     5.2x 86% Total acquisition loan agreement 3,600
Revolving credit facility (RCF) (Euribor + var. margin) 600        0.9x 14% Replacement of old P7S1 RCF 500
Additional new RCF capacity 100
Total loan agreement 4,200     6.1x 100% Total loan agreement 4,200     
SBS income statement 2003 2004 2005 2006 CAGR Average
Revenues 582       678      880      1,003   
Growth in % 17% 30% 14% 20% 20%
EBITDA 73         104      145      207      
in % of revenues 13% 15% 16% 21% 42% 16%
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Exhibit 12: P7S1 stock price development (2003 – 2014) 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Exhibit 13: Lavena 1 S.à.r.l. key financials (2007 – 2012) 
 
(1) Lavena 1 serves as the ultimate holding company for P7S1. P7S1 is fully consolidated in Lavena 1. Lavena 1 also 
includes the debt facilities used to acquire P7S1. The holding was registered in Luxembourg and liquidated in 2013. 
Source: Lavena 1 S.à.r.l. Annual Reports 2007 - 2012 



























ProSiebenSat.1 MDAX Index DAX Index
Lavena 1 S.à.r.l. (€m) (1) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total equity 1,849           203              84                381              887              1,011           
Long-term loans and borrowings 6,080           5,550           5,671           5,697           4,371           4,430           
Total non-current liabilities 6,939           6,540           6,742           6,664           5,260           5,233           
Short-term loans and borrowings 62                713              730              544              278              473              
Total current liabilities 1,004           1,577           1,641           1,493           1,184           1,442           
Net financial debt 5,353           5,536           5,583           5,473           4,016           4,109           
Balance sheet (€m) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cash & cash equivalents 62        295      158      64        251      633      737      741      518      702      396      471      
Programming assets 1,148   1,110   1,058   1,056   1,318   1,380   1,527   1,655   1,531   1,277   1,202   1,212   
Total assets 1,898   2,059   2,017   1,932   5,999   5,930   6,175   6,316   5,034   5,413   3,556   3,901   
Shareholder equity 602      1,004   1,188   1,241   1,062   479      581      1,026   1,441   1,501   584      754      
Non-controlling interests 1         1         (2)        1         10       19       8         9         10       5         10       16       
Non-current loans and borrowings n/a n/a n/a n/a 3,577   3,523   3,535   3,531   2,336   2,342   1,842   1,973   
Current loans and borrowings n/a n/a n/a n/a 2          517      497      231      0          231      -      -      
Net financial debt 665      279      227      122      3,328   3,407   3,295   3,021   1,818   1,871   1,446   1,503   
Total liabilities 1,296   1,055   829      692      4,937   5,451   5,594   5,290   3,592   3,912   2,972   3,147   
Income statement (€m) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Revenues 1,807   1,835   1,990   2,105   2,703   3,054   2,761   3,000   2,756   2,356   2,605   2,876   
Gross profit 443      569      714      804      1,084   1,187   1,156   1,392   1,255   1,090   1,174   1,315   
Operating profit 131      286      384      444      384      267      476      670      607      601      669      695      
Financial income/loss (70)      (69)      (33)      (58)      (136)    (335)    (245)    (241)    (240)    (144)    (142)    (134)    
Pre-tax profit 61        218      351      387      249      (68)      231      429      367      457      527      560      
Consolidated profit for the year 39        134      221      244      96        (125)    150      318      644      299      317      354      
Profit from discontinued operations n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 375     (30)      (48)      (27)      
Results of continuing operations (€m) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Recurring EBITDA n/a n/a n/a n/a 662      675      697      906      792      745      790      847      
EBITDA 189      321      419      484      521      618      623      808      694      680      758      818      




Source: P7S1 Annual Reports 2003 - 2014 
Exhibit 15: Trading multiples 
Source: Bloomberg, Company Information, Press 
Exhibit 16: Precedent transactions 
 
(1) KKR and Permira paid €1.691bn to acquire all SBS assets and assumed all its liabilities, resulting in a transaction 
value of €1.864bn. The deal was based on an enterprise value of €2.091bn. Afterwards they held 80%. 
Source: Bloomberg, Company Information, Press 
 
Cash flow statement (€m) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cash flow from operating activities 1,184   1,056   1,166   1,272   1,594   1,352   1,478   1,607   1,357   1,565   1,407   1,444   
Depreciation and amortization 58        35        35        40        137      355      148      138      146      80        89        124      
Consumption of programming assets 983      950      937      938      1,127   1,224   1,038   1,063   1,063   836      847      863      
Change in working capital 69        (58)      (44)      (1)        190      (79)      93        43        (13)      (33)      (15)      (12)      
Cash flow from investing activities (1,100) (934)    (1,096) (980)    (3,269) (1,150) (1,320) (1,325) 149      (1,264) 164      (1,174) 
Net investments in intangible assets and PPE (6)        (15)      (24)      (25)      (37)      (82)      (77)      (73)      (87)      (88)      (90)      (91)      
Net investments in programming assets (1,091) (919)    (897)    (946)    (1,168) (1,352) (1,214) (1,199) (1,124) (823)    (848)    (882)    
Net operating CAPEX (1,097) (934)    (921)    (970)    (1,205) (1,435) (1,291) (1,271) (1,211) (912)    (938)    (974)    
Cash flow from financing activities (90)      110      (253)    (386)    1,863   179      (56)      (290)    (1,725) (32)      (1,956) (208)    
Change of interest-bearing liabilities (88)      (168)    (189)    (205)    2,055   464      (31)      (278)    (1,431) 230      (732)    140      
Dividends paid (2)        (2)        (63)      (182)    (193)    (270)    (2)        (2)        (241)    (246)    (1,201) (313)    
Share repurchases -      -      -      -      -      (15)      (15)      -      (33)      -      -      -      
Key performance indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sales growth in % n/a 2% 8% 6% 28% 13% (10%) 9% (8%) (15%) 11% 10%
Operating profit margin in % 7% 16% 19% 21% 14% 9% 17% 22% 22% 26% 26% 24%
Profit margin in % 2% 7% 11% 12% 4% (4%) 5% 11% 23% 13% 12% 12%
Recurring EBITDA margin in % n/a n/a n/a n/a 24% 22% 25% 30% 29% 32% 30% 29%
EBITDA margin in % 10% 18% 21% 23% 19% 20% 23% 27% 25% 29% 29% 28%
EBIT margin in % 7% 16% 19% 21% 14% 9% 17% 22% 21% 26% 26% 24%
Debt to equity (book value) 2.2x 1.1x 0.7x 0.6x 4.6x 11.4x 9.6x 5.2x 2.5x 2.6x 5.1x 4.2x
Net financial debt  to EBITDA 3.5x 0.9x 0.5x 0.3x 6.4x 5.5x 5.3x 3.7x 2.6x 2.7x 1.9x 1.8x
Net financial debt  to recurring EBITDA n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.0x 5.1x 4.7x 3.3x 2.3x 2.5x 1.8x 1.8x
Depreciation and amortization in % of revenues 3% 2% 2% 2% 5% 12% 5% 5% 5% 3% 3% 4%
Consumption of programming assets in % of revenues 54% 52% 47% 45% 42% 40% 38% 35% 39% 35% 33% 30%
Change in working capital in % of revenues 4% (3%) (2%) (0%) 7% (3%) 3% 1% (0%) (1%) (1%) (0%)
Net operating CAPEX in % of revenues (61%) (51%) (46%) (46%) (45%) (47%) (47%) (42%) (44%) (39%) (36%) (34%)
Trading comparables Financials in m Trading multiples Profitability























British Sky Broadcasting UK GBP 4,148 1,017 877 551 9,171 2,836 12,007 2.9x 11.8x 13.7x 16.6x 2.8x 25% 21% 13%
ITV UK GBP 2,181 372 264 222 4,142 1,983 6,132 2.8x 16.5x 23.2x 18.7x 5.3x 17% 12% 10%
M6 FRA EUR 1,283 298 220 152 3,569 554 4,124 3.2x 13.9x 18.8x 23.4x 1.9x 23% 17% 12%
Mediaset ITA EUR 3,748 1,922 1,037 506 10,619 2,948 13,568 3.6x 7.1x 13.1x 21.0x 1.5x 51% 28% 13%
Modern Times Group SWE SEK 10,137 1,959 1,778 1,499 29,525 3,454 33,100 3.3x 16.9x 18.6x 19.7x 1.8x 19% 18% 15%
RTL Group LUX/DEU EUR 5,640 1,220 1,042 1,111 13,111 2,515 16,149 2.9x 13.2x 15.5x 11.8x 2.1x 22% 18% 20%
TF1 FRA EUR 2,654 403 301 199 6,017 2,065 8,082 3.0x 20.1x 26.9x 30.3x 5.1x 15% 11% 7%
Vivendi FRA EUR 20,044 5,738 4,147 5,193 34,198 18,784 54,934 2.7x 9.6x 13.2x 6.6x 3.3x 29% 21% 26%
Min 2.7x 7.1x 13.1x 6.6x 1.5x 15% 11% 7%
Mean 3.1x 13.6x 17.9x 18.5x 3.0x 25% 18% 15%
Median 3.0x 13.5x 17.1x 19.2x 2.4x 22% 18% 13%
Max 3.6x 20.1x 26.9x 30.3x 5.3x 51% 28% 26%
Selected precedent transactions (Figures in m)










Nov-06 British Sky Broadcasting Public tender offer ITV (18% stake) UK GBP 940      5,249  4,559         498 9.2x
Nov-06 Nordic Broadcasting Oy Schibsted ASA TV4 (27% stake) SWE SEK 1,455 5,409  5,200 445        11.7x
Aug-05 Permira, KKR TVSL SA SBS Broadcasting (80% stake) (1) LUX/NOR EUR 1,864 n/a  2,094 122        17.2x
May-05 Bertelsmann Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung RTL Group (8% stake) LUX/DEU EUR 550    7,432  7,542 886        8.5x
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TEACHING NOTES 
The case is sought to be interpreted as an example of many unsuccessful LBOs which happened 
during the peak of the buyout boom in the early 2000’s as a consequence of both, excessive finan-
cial leverage and unfavorable economic conditions. The discussion of the case should cover the 
typical characteristics of a private equity investment and highlight the unique aspects of the P7S1 
investment, namely the characteristics of the target and transaction structure in the context of in-
tense competition around M&A transactions and the financial crisis. Finally, students should judge 
whether the investment was good or bad, based on financial analysis and strategic thoughts. This 
case can be used in Corporate Finance, Private Equity and other M&A related courses. 
1. Which characteristics should a company have to create value in a LBO? 
One can distinguish four main value creation levers in LBO transactions (Revenue growth, increase 
in profitability, deleveraging or cash generation and multiple arbitrage) which determine the key 
characteristics of a suitable target. As a consequence, financial sponsors ideally invest in companies 
with a strong and defendable position in a market with significant growth potential and/or a con-
solidation opportunity. From a financing point of view, the target must generate strong and stable 
cash flows while having low capital expenditure needs and non-specific quality assets to be used 
as collateral in order to maximize leverage. From a strategic point of view, the company should 
have potential for expansion and operational improvements supported by a competent and moti-
vated management team. Finally, there must be a considerable number of potential buyers in order 
to design a realistic exit scenario. The investment thesis can stress different traits, depending on 
the target.  
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2. Put yourself in the position of Permira. Would you invest in P7S1 on a stand-alone basis?  
P7S1 features several traits which make the company an attractive LBO target. The group operates 
in Europe’s largest market which grew by a CAGR of 5.5% from 2003 until 2006 (Exhibit 2). 
P7S1 is in a strong competitive position when negotiating with advertising agencies due to its high 
market share and low cost-per-mille, thus creating significant entry barriers for potential competi-
tors (Exhibit 3). Furthermore, the high level of vertical integration allows the group to decrease 
programming costs and benefit from additional revenue streams. In addition, the group has shown 
strong financial performance since the investment of Haim Saban: the stock price almost quadru-
pled, revenue growth exceeded growth of advertising sales in Germany every year and operating 
profit margin tripled from 7% to 21% (Exhibits 4, 6, 14). Finally, P7S1 has driven diversification 
into new digital segments (e.g. Maxdome) and is therefore well positioned for future growth (Ex-
hibit 5). Using this momentum, P7S1 could provide value creation potential.  
Some factors may limit the value creation potential of P7S1. First, organic growth in the core busi-
ness is limited, given the high level of market concentration and regulation in Germany combined 
with growth rates that represent a rather saturated market (Exhibits 2, 3, 4). Also the market con-
centration in Europe does not easily allow for internationalization. Furthermore, Saban has stream-
lined the group’s operations which reduces sources for further cost reductions and margin improve-
ments (Exhibit 6). In addition, the cyclical nature of the advertising business leads to fluctuations 
in cash flows which represent a financing risk. Furthermore, the shift of advertising from traditional 
TV to digital media creates competition from new market entrants with considerable financial re-
sources (e.g. telecommunication providers). Since there is only one direct competitor to P7S1 and 
publishing company Axel Springer has also been prevented from acquiring the group, it is plausible 
to assume that there is no potential domestic strategic buyer. The size of P7S1 further limits the 
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number of exit candidates. Thus, there exists an exit risk for the investors. While the fact that P7S1 
is publicly listed therefore provides a convenient exit route (if P7S1 is not taken private), it also 
creates reputational risks. Private equity investors are usually not used to deal with public attention 
and negative publicity may affect their reputation and future fundraising ability.  
3. How does the ownership of SBS influence your investment decision? 
The fact that KKR and Permira own SBS, changes the investment thesis as it allows to benefit in 
two ways. First, a sale to P7S1 provides a way to make a quick return on SBS.17 Second, SBS 
offers additional value levers for a P7S1 buyout and mitigates some of the issues mentioned before, 
namely limited growth potential due to saturated domestic markets, limited opportunities for inter-
nationalization and cyclicality. The integration of SBS increases the size of P7S1 immediately and 
develops it into a major European player with exposure to high-growth regions. Furthermore, ge-
ographic and product diversification lowers revenue volatility which in return lowers the opera-
tional risk. In addition, the group benefits from annual synergies of €90m. As explained in question 
1, growth and profitability directly translate into LBO value creation. 
4. What other factors may have played a role for Thomas Krenz and Permira? 
Private equity firms were under pressure to make deals and deliver returns despite high valuations. 
The latter was especially true for Permira and Thomas Krenz, who had recently struggled to make 
successful deals whilst having a new fund in his back. As a Managing Partner, Krenz thus had not 
only a professional but also a personal interest to acquire P7S1. 
                                                 





2 − 1 = 25%. The money multiple for KKR was 2.2x on an equity investment of €351m. 
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5. Was the SBS deal overpriced from the perspective of P7S1?  
In fact, KKR and Permira were heavily criticized by the media when they sold SBS at a price of 
€3.3bn to P7S1. Taking into account the 2006 EBITDA of €207m (Exhibit 11), students can cal-
culate a valuation range for SBS (based on Exhibits 1, 15 and 16).  
 
While the overall average multiple paid in European LBOs is not representative for the European 
media industry, trading multiples give a better impression. Considering a 20-30% control premium 
on the median EBITDA multiple of 13.5x, the EV range for SBS is €3.4-3.6bn. Precedent transac-
tions indicate a lower EV range. Although the transactions serve as good benchmarks in terms of 
size, operations and geography, they are not meaningful for the valuation of SBS, as they include 
minority deals. Only the majority takeover of SBS in 2005 points to a similar valuation.  
In conclusion, the SBS valuation of €3.3bn cannot be considered overpriced, especially when con-
sidering the strategic value of SBS for P7S1. Nevertheless, one should consider that KKR and 
Permira acquired SBS only 21 months before at a valuation of €2.1bn. Although this raises ques-



























Average European LBO 
EBITDA multiple 2007
Median trading multiple FY2006 SBS / KKR & Permira
TV4 / Nordic Broadcasting ITV / BSkyB RTL / Bertelsmann
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6. Had P7S1 been overleveraged? 
To discuss this question, students can develop a model to forecast how P7S1 could have developed 
without the financial crisis, especially with regards to its financial position and credit statistics, as 
illustrated on the next page. Taking a conservative standpoint (as preferred by banks), future reve-
nue growth is assumed to be 6%, which is in line with P7S1’s and significantly lower than SBS’s 
historical performance (Exhibits 11 and 14). Growth is expected to come from exposure to growth 
regions, digital broadcasting and HDTV. The EBITDA margin is assumed to be 18% in line with 
the four-year average of P7S1. As stated on page 9, synergies will be fully realized in 2010 and are 
assumed to build gradually until then. The tax rate is based on the statutory tax rate in Germany in 
2006. Other assumptions are made in line with P7S1’s past financial performance (Exhibit 14). 
The debt schedule assumes that term loan B is fully repaid in July 2014 and interest is paid for the 
first six months of 2014 (Exhibit 10). No RCF drawdown has been taken into account. The income 
statement uses the combined 2006 results of P7S1 and SBS (Exhibits 11 and 14) as starting point. 
To support the bank case, no dividends for common shareholders were assumed. Although this is 
a simplified model used for academic purposes, it shows that P7S1 might have digested the deal 
even under conservative assumptions. While the net debt to EBITDA ratio is very high in the be-
ginning, the cash cover and interest cover indicate that P7S1 has headroom left. Only the repayment 
of term loan B in July 2014 would require a refinancing. Profitability and free cash flow is positive 
in every year except for 2014, when P7S1 would have to do a refinancing. Nevertheless, the model 
builds on the assumption of constant growth. Although the combination of SBS and P7S1 lowers 
revenue volatility, a cross-border recession such as the financial crisis could cause serious issues. 
While we do not know the debt covenants, it is plausible to assume that a recession may breach at 
least one covenant (most likely the maximum net debt to EBITDA ratio). In conclusion, one can 




Assumptions 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
Revenue growth 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
EBITDA margin 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
Revenue synergies (€m) 0 10 20 30 30 30 30 30
Cost synergies (€m) 0 20 40 60 60 60 60 60
Consumption of programming assets in % of revenues 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45%
Δ Working capital in % of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
CAPEX in % of revenues (46%) (46%) (46%) (46%) (46%) (46%) (46%) (46%)
D&A in % of revenues 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Euribor rate 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80% 2.80%
Tax rate 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38%
Debt Repayment Schedule (€m) 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
Senior secured term loan B (Euribor + 1.75%)
Opening book value 1,800    1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   
Repayments -        -      -      -      -      -      -      (1,800) 
Closing book value 1,800    1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   -      
Interest payments (82)        (82)      (82)      (82)      (82)      (82)      (82)      (41)      
Senior secured term loan C (Euribor + 1.875%)
Opening book value 1,800    1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   
Repayments -        -      -      -      -      -      -      -      
Closing book value 1,800    1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   1,800   
Interest payments (84)        (84)      (84)      (84)      (84)      (84)      (84)      (84)      
Pro Forma Income Statement (€m) 2006a 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
Revenues (6% growth + synergies) 3,108    3,294    3,502   3,732   3,986   4,255   4,540   4,843   5,163   
EBITDA (18% margin + synergies) 691       593       650      712      777      826      877      932      989      
(-) D&A (66)        (70)      (75)      (80)      (85)      (91)      (97)      (103)    
(-) Interest payments (166)      (166)    (166)    (166)    (166)    (166)    (125)    -      
EBT 361       414      471      532      575      620      710      886      
Tax Rate 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38% 38%
Taxes paid (137)      (157)    (179)    (202)    (218)    (236)    (270)    (337)    
Pro Forma Cash Flow Statement (€m) 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
EBITDA 593       650      712      777      826      877      932      989      
(+) Consumption of programming assets 1,482    1,576   1,679   1,794   1,915   2,043   2,179   2,323   
(-) Δ Working capital (66)        (70)      (75)      (80)      (85)      (91)      (97)      (103)    
(-) CAPEX (1,515)   (1,611) (1,717) (1,833) (1,957) (2,088) (2,228) (2,375) 
(-) Taxes paid (137)      (157)    (179)    (202)    (218)    (236)    (270)    (337)    
Operating free cash flow 357       388      421      456      480      505      517      498      
Interest payments (166)      (166)    (166)    (166)    (166)    (166)    (166)    (125)    
Debt repayment -        -      -      -      -      -      -      (1,800) 
Minimum dividend to preferred shareholders (2)          (2)        (2)        (2)        (2)        (2)        (2)        (2)        
Free cash flow 189       220      253      288      312      337      348      (1,430) 
Pro Forma Balance Sheet (€m) 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
Cash 189       220      253      288      312      337      348      (1,430) 
Financial debt 3,600    3,600   3,600   3,600   3,600   3,600   3,600   1,800   
Net financial debt 3,411    3,380   3,347   3,312   3,288   3,263   3,252   3,230   
Leverage Statistics 2007f 2008f 2009f 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f
Net financial debt to EBITDA 5.8x 5.2x 4.7x 4.3x 4.0x 3.7x 3.5x 3.3x
Cash cover (Operating cash flow to debt service) 2.1x 2.3x 2.5x 2.7x 2.9x 3.0x 3.1x 0.3x
Interest cover (EBITDA to interest payments) 3.6x 3.9x 4.3x 4.7x 5.0x 5.3x 5.6x 7.9x
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7. Was it bad luck or bad management what caused trouble for the investment?  
While some financial decisions, such as the choice of the level of leverage or the €270m dividend 
in 2008 can be questioned, other factors outside the sponsor’s sphere of responsibility have con-
tributed to the distress of P7S1. The major factor was the credit crunch which did not allow any 
new financing decisions (e.g. capital increase, refinancing). In addition, the financial crisis hit the 
real economy to an extent which could not be foreseen. This led to a situation where P7S1 had to 
meet its debt service commitments despite lower profitability while a €270m dividend and a €120m 
cartel fine represented additional major cash outflows. Hedge funds creating additional pressure 
was another logical consequence of this situation. The disposal of all SBS assets can therefore not 
be seen as a strategic failure of the initial investment thesis but the need to restructure the company 
and reduce debt. The failure of the new advertising sales model and replacement of the entire man-
agement team however indicate some bad strategic decisions. As a result, although the sponsors 
pursued an aggressive financing strategy, there is no clear indication that their investment thesis 
would have also failed if the financial crisis had not happened.  
8. What was the approximate return for KKR and Permira? Make assumptions, if needed. 
The case gives all information needed to calculate the proceeds from share disposals (Pages 12, 
13, 15). All dividends can be calculated from Exhibit 6. The initial equity investment of €987m 
can be taken from Exhibit 7. As no information is available on the financing of €509m for the 
acquisition of Axel Springer’s 12% stake, students can assume it was financed through equity 
(Page 10). Until 2013, Permira had used all proceeds from dividends and share disposals for debt 
service and restructuring (Page 15). Therefore, only 2012 and 2013 dividends can be returned to 
investors. In the same manner, only 2013 and 2014 share disposals are considered. From the gross 
proceeds the net financial debt of Lavena 1 is subtracted as it has to be fully repaid before cash can 
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be returned to LPs. Since Lavena 1 was liquidated in 2013, net financial debt is assumed to be the 
same as in 2012 (Exhibit 13). Since P7S1 is fully consolidated in Lavena 1 but the debt of P7S1 is 
not refinanced at exit, the net financial debt of Lavena 1 is considered net of P7S1 net financial 
debt. Based on these assumptions the exit waterfall can be calculated. For a simple IRR calculation, 





Share transactions Acquisitions Disposals
Date Mar-07 Apr-07 Jan-08 Aug-08 Jan-11 Feb-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14















% acquired / sold 13% 0.3% 12% 7.3% 18%
# of shares (m) 14.2                  0.3                    13.1                  8.0           19.7         
Price per share (€) 22.40 22.45 19.40 24.20 24.60
Value (€m) 319                   7                       255                   194          485          
Common shares
% acquired / sold 88% 12% 12% 11% 16% 17%
# of shares (m) 96.3                  13.1                  13.1         24.1         35.0         37.2         
Price per share (€) 28.71 19.40 28.71 30.67 31.82 34.75
Value (€m) 2,764                255                   377          738          1,114       1,293       
Total value (€m) 3,083                7                       509                   377          194          485          738          1,114       1,293       
Shares 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
# of preferred shares (m) 109.4      109.4      109.4      109.4      109.4      109.4      -         -         
# of common shares (m) 109.4      109.4      109.4      109.4      109.4      109.4      218.8      218.8      
Dividends 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ex-dividend date Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jul-11 May-12 Jul-13 Jun-14 May-15
% preferred shares at end of the year 13% 25% 25% 25% 18% 18% 0% 0%
% common shares at end of the year 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 17% 0%
Dividend per share of preferred stock (€) 1.25 0.02 0.02 1.14 1.17 5.65 n/a n/a
Dividend per share of common stock (€) 1.23 0.00 0.00 1.12 1.15 5.63 1.47 1.60
Total dividends received (€m) 137         1             1             139         134         653         53           -         
LBO return calculation
Exit waterfall  (€m)
(+) Total dividends received 1,117         
(-) Dividends used for debt service (411)          
(+) Total proceeds from share disposal 4,200         
(-) Proceeds from share disposal used for debt service (571)          
Total proceeds 4,336         
(-) Lavena net financial debt 2012 (4,109)       
(+) P7S1 net financial debt 2012 1,871         
Total equity proceeds 2,098         
Money multiple
Initial investment (2007) 987            
Second investment (2008) 509            
Total equity investment 1,497         
Total equity proceeds 2,098         
Total cash on cash (Money multiple) 1.4x
IRR 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
6.1% (987)    (509)    0 0 0 0 2,098   0
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9. Was it a good investment from a financial point of view? What other factors have to be 
taken into account when evaluating the investment from a financial sponsor’s point of view?  
Financial sponsors traditionally aim to generate an IRR of 20-25% and a money multiple of 2.0-
2.5x. From a sole returns perspective, the investment can therefore not be considered successful. 
While LPs expect high returns on their investment, reputation is even more important for a financial 
sponsor in the long-term as it impacts both, the ability to raise future funds from investors and to 
gain ownership over companies. In the case of P7S1, Permira and KKR were not able to realize 
their initial investment thesis. Furthermore, they used too much leverage, had to sell substantial 
parts of the business, replaced the entire management team and laid off more than 400 employees. 
In addition, the sponsor’s actions received great public attention since P7S1 remained publicly 
listed. These events may have built a reputation which causes reservation from many company 
owners and management teams to sell their company. As a conclusion, the investment cannot be 
considered a good investment, neither from a financial nor from a strategic perspective. In fact, 
Permira struggled to raise a new fund after the financial crisis.  
